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Abstract: This paper examines the effect that past experiences have on the decision to 
invest in protective measures. These protective measures serve to mitigate damages 
should the event occur again.  It shows that three past experiences with negative 
consequences - Hurricane Andrew, the Aspen Wildfire, and the SoBig.F computer virus - 
have all served to increase investment in protective measures. Additionally, it uses an 
example of data analysis on a hurricane simulation game to show that these effects are 
not always pervasive and offers reasons for why this might be.  Overall, changes in 
investment seem to be greatest when the value of the losses is high and media coverage is 
significant.  Some policy implications to correct the problem of underinvestment before 
the occurrence of an event include greater government interaction and exploration of 
private sector solutions to increase the incentives for individuals to invest in protection. 
Introduction 
 
 With the proliferation of disasters that have occurred recently and the rising 
damages they have brought with them, investment in protection is a growing concern.  
Individuals, businesses, and governments have difficult decisions to make when it comes 
to investing in measures aimed at mitigating damages.  One might think that these parties 
would choose to invest optimally in protecting themselves from loss.  “Optimal” in this 
context is explained as the systematic calculation of risk and potential losses balanced 
with the cost and predicted benefits of total investment in protective measures.  Thus, the 
decision-making process in this case would take into account the probability of an event 
occurring and the amount of damages that such an event would cause.  It would then 
evaluate the economic benefits that a particular protective measure might provide and 
examine the probability that the measure will be effective.  The total value of the 
expected benefit would then be discounted at the discount rate and compared with the 
total discounted value of the expected costs.  Those with benefits greater than costs 
would be chosen.  However, research shows that optimal investment often is not the 
case.1,2,3  Numerous factors, including budget constraints, short term goals, difficulties 
assessing risk, and uncertainty of future benefits may change the approach that these 
parties take toward making their decisions.4 
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In particular, this paper focuses on those situations in which parties are affected 
by a disaster of some sort and must then make decisions about future investment.  Rather 
than examining the investment decision in a vacuum, this paper seeks to explore the role 
of past experience in causing investment levels to change.  Past experiences in this case 
are defined as a prior instance in which the party was affected by a situation from which 
it is seeking to protect itself.  Thus the occurrence of this instance must have caused the 
party to suffer a loss.  Additionally, the instances considered are ones in which the party 
is able to mitigate the amount of damages caused by the event but cannot change the 
probability of the event occurring.   
This paper will explore three case studies to address the role of past experience in 
changing decisions to invest in protective measures.  In the first, hurricane protection will 
be considered.  The damages caused by Hurricane Andrew will be explained and will be 
shown to have caused changes in protective measures taken to mitigate future losses from 
hurricanes.  A similar case study on wildfires will be examined, with the Aspen Wildfire 
being shown to have provoked increased investment in wildfire protection.  The final 
case study will examine IT security and will demonstrate the changes brought about by 
the SoBig.F virus.  
To further test the hypothesis that past experience has an effect on increasing 
investment in protection, a simulation game will be examined.  The game is designed to 
simulate decisions to invest in hurricane protection for a hypothetical home located in a 
hurricane-prone region.  The data gathered from the game will then be analyzed to see if 
past hurricanes cause players to invest in greater levels of protection. 
Additionally, implications and policy recommendations will be offered to help 
avoid the problem in the future.  Finally, this paper will close with conclusions that can 
be drawn from the material presented. 
 
Existing Literature 
 Much research has previously been done on the topic of past experience and its 
role in decision-making.  One example is Technology and Social Shock, by Edward W. 
Lawless.  In his book, Lawless reports on a series of forty-five case studies, each one 
based on a particular adverse event related to technological progress.  For each case, 
Lawless gives a chronological depiction of the happenings leading up to and surrounding 
the particular event, as well as an account of what changes occurred as a result of the 
event.  One particular case study concerns botulism, a rare and deadly poison to which 
humans can be exposed due to the improper processing of canned goods.  Lawless 
describes the death of one man in 1971.  This death was determined to have been caused 
by botulism from a can of Bon Vivant soup.  Lawless discusses the large volume of press 
coverage and increasingly widespread fear caused by the botulism scare.  As a result of 
this case, Bon Vivant was forced to declare bankruptcy, the government increased its 
scrutiny of factory canning processes, and companies imposed their own stricter 
guidelines to follow in processing canned foods.5 
 The role of past experience in investment decisions also is closely related to 
existing literature on the availability bias.  The availability bias was first defined in 1973 
by Kahneman and Tversky as one of the heuristics people use when making estimates of 
probability (along with representativeness and anchoring and adjustment).  According to 
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this theory, people use their own recall of instances to estimate the probability of their 
occurrence.  Thus, they will tend to overestimate the probability of instances that are 
easily recalled and vice versa for those that are difficult to bring to mind.6 
 Agans and Shaffer conducted another study to test the availability heuristic.  They 
designed an experiment in which they gave participants a scenario to read that involved 
lung cancer, a car accident, or a homicide.  They then tested the subjects’ ability to 
accurately predict probabilities of the events occurring.  They found that priming 
participants with information about one of these misfortunes increased the participant’s 
evaluation of the probability that the event would occur, giving weight to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s theory of the availability bias.7 
 
Investment in Hurricane Protection 
 Both firms and individuals in coastal areas are faced with decisions regarding how 
much to spend on protection from hurricanes.  Hurricane protection is interesting to 
consider, because while a strong storm may result in destroyed property regardless of its 
owners’ foresight, making investments ahead of time will often bring benefits in terms of 
mitigated damages.  In addition, hurricanes represent an event in which people may try to 
lessen the consequences, but have no control over the probability of the storm occurring. 
A wide range of measures is available for those seeking to protect themselves 
from damages.  For instance, the property owner may engage in such simple activities as 
buying plywood and sizing it to fit over each window.  According to USA Today, a plan 
must be in place beforehand in order for this strategy to be successful.  Otherwise, the 
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limited amount of time between the knowledge of an impending storm and its arrival may 
not be sufficient for it to be carried out.8  Similarly, damages may be mitigated by easily 
accomplished activities.  These activities include carrying loose items into the house to 
keep them from turning into hazards by the heavy winds, and keeping shrubs trimmed 
and loose branches cleaned up.  These measures have relatively low costs and can help 
protect the homes of owners and their neighbors. 
 On the other hand, some investments require a greater amount of foresight, time, 
and capital expenditure.  For mitigating the damages of hurricanes, protecting windows is 
most important, and significant protection can be obtained from installing sturdy shutters 
and impact-resistant windows.  Sturdy shutters are less likely to break off in the wind and 
crash into windows; impact-resistant windows are designed to endure strong blows if 
items of any sort are knocked into them.9  These measures tend to be more expensive, and 
can range from $3,000 to $8,500 for a 1,500-square-foot home.10  However, they can 
offer large benefits as they protect the most vulnerable part of the house.  Investing in 
these “home improvement” measures requires more than a last minute effort at 
protection.  Likewise, the decision to invest in hurricane insurance is not one that can be 
made with a storm on the horizon.  
 In analyzing the role that prior experience plays in making investments in 
hurricane protection, it is useful to examine a particular event.  In this case, the chosen 
event is Hurricane Andrew due to its extensive reach and particularly damaging 
consequences.  Hurricane Andrew hit several states around the Gulf of Mexico, but its 
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wrath was felt most harshly in southern Florida and south-central Louisiana.  It was 
classified as a category 4 storm (the second highest rating) and lasted from August 16-28, 
1992.11  With winds reaching up to 175 mph, it caused over $25 billion in total damages 
with $15.5 billion in insured losses.12  This makes Hurricane Andrew the most expensive 
natural disaster in history.  To give a more detailed picture of the wreckage cause by 
Hurricane Andrew, it was responsible for 26 deaths13 and the destruction of over 25,000 
homes, with another 101,000 that were damaged.14  Additionally, many insurance 
companies did not have sufficient funds to cover losses sustained by their customers, 
leading to another crisis and the bankruptcy of nine insurers.15  Even more striking, 
however, was the Dade County Grand Jury’s estimate that many of these damages could 
have been prevented had it not been for “noncompliance with building codes, faulty 
structural designs, and the scarcity of building material and tradesmen to make repairs.”16 
 The question then becomes, how did the parties that suffered this loss respond?  
Did they subsequently increase their investment in protective measures in order to 
mitigate the damages from future hurricanes?  Or did they react in the opposite manner, 
believing that any measures they could have taken would have been ineffective?  
Significant evidence shows that they tended to do the former rather than the latter.  As a 
result of Hurricane Andrew, Florida and other states adopted more stringent building 
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codes as defined by the International Building Code.  Materials used for windows now 
have to endure a “large missile” test, or the force of a nine pound 2x4 hurled at 34 miles 
per hour, a “small missile” test, or the force of two grams of steel moving at 80 feet per 
second, and a cyclical pressure test, designed to make windows endure the usual pressure 
changes observed inside and outside the home during hurricanes.17  Hotlines and 
newspapers now offer tips on preparing for hurricanes so that people know to take easy 
steps such as covering windows with plywood and carrying all loose items inside.18,19  
Moreover, the insurance crisis was addressed by both insurers themselves and by 
the state of Florida.  Insurers, shocked by the unexpectedly high amount of losses, began 
to invest in catastrophic modeling techniques that use technology to better estimate their 
risk and allow them to adjust premiums accordingly.20  Along with this, they have raised 
home insurance premiums to create larger pools of money should such an event occur 
again.  According to Florida’s Department of Insurance, “the top 10 hurricane insurance 
writers in the state have increased their rates an average of 137 percent since Hurricane 
Andrew.”21  Coastal areas of Florida have suffered the brunt of these rate increases, as 
other regions are at lower risk and less willing to pay significant increases.22  The state 
reacted to the insurance crisis by creating the Residential Property and Casualty Joint 
Underwriting Association to offer insurance to those homeowners who are unable to 
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afford it in the private market.23  They also created the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe 
Fund as a reinsurance fund able to offer up to $11 billion should the state’s insurance 
companies face another crisis.24  These changes were implemented directly after the 
devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew, supporting the hypothesis that past experience 
tends to draw increased attention to a potential problem and, subsequently raise the level 
of investment in preventing the damages it causes. 
 
Investment in Wildfire Protection 
 Another investment decision that must be made is that by those living in western 
forested states when choosing how much to invest in protection against the threat of 
wildfires.  Contrary to popular belief, wildfires represent a natural disaster whose 
consequences may be mitigated by taking certain measures taken beforehand.  For 
instance, processes such as forest thinning and prescribed burning can slow the spread of 
wildfires.  These processes involve purposely cutting down trees or burning them in a 
controlled manner in order to eliminate some of the fuel that would otherwise burn once a 
forest fire breaks out.25  In addition, buildings can be constructed with fire-resistant 
materials.  These materials are made to endure flames for a certain amount of time and 
can help to slow the spread of fires between buildings.26  Aside from constructing their 
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homes to be safer, residents also can help to protect themselves and their neighbors by 
clearing their yards of flammable materials such as trees and pine needles.27 
 An interesting wildfire episode to look at when considering its impact on 
protection decisions is that of the recent Aspen Wildfire.  The Aspen Wildfire began on 
June 17, 2003, and was concentrated in the Coronado Forest in Arizona.  It covered an 
area of 84,750 acres and was particularly damaging to Mount Lemmon.28  Like many 
forest fires in this area, it was caused by intense wind and dry heat and exacerbated by 
draught and an abundance of fuel.  The Aspen Wildfire lasted approximately one month 
and devastated the town of Summerhaven.  It destroyed 335 homes and businesses, 
damaged 5 others, and cost $16.3 million to fight.29  “Damage to electric lines, phone 
lines, water facilities, streets, and sewers” alone amounted to $4.1 million.30  In addition, 
runoff of ash occurred when the rains finally began to put out the flames.  This brought 
about another $2.7 million in expenses aimed at preventing soil loss, and caused damages 
in Sabino Canyon even though the flames from the fire never reached the area.31  As was 
the case with Hurricane Andrew, experts estimated that approximately 60% of 
Summerhaven residents had taken steps to make their homes safer from the spread of 
fires.32  Had more people engaged in such activities, the total damages could have been 
much lower. 
 In reaction to the Aspen Wildfire and other summer wildfires, President Bush 
enacted the Healthy Forest Initiative, raising federal funding for firefighting by 55% and 
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promising $760 million in fiscal year 2005, a significant portion of which will be used for 
prescribed burning and forest thinning to eliminate some of the hazardous fuel that helps 
fires spread quickly.33  According to the plan, an additional 3.7 million acres will be 
treated for fuel reduction.34  Residents are pushing for even greater funds.  In the 
meantime, outreach groups have begun to offer seminars on how to make homes more 
“fire-wise” by telling residents how to clear space around their homes to slow the spread 
of fires.35  In addition, local governments have adopted tougher building codes requiring 
the exteriors of new homes to be built of materials that can withstand flames for up to an 
hour and roofs to be made of Class A material that resists flames.36,37  These laws have 
been adhered to during the rebuilding process of Summerhaven.  New zoning laws 
require residents to be responsible for creating more “defensible space” around buildings, 
or space that is not filled with trees and other flammable materials, to slow down the 
spread of fires.38,39  Therefore the same reaction to past experience that was witnessed in 
the case of Hurricane Andrew appears with the Aspen Wildfire as well.  
 
Investment in IT Security 
 A final decision to invest in protection is one made by both individuals and 
businesses when choosing how they will engage in IT security.  One of the most common 
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threats to IT security, and the one on which this paper will focus, is the spread of viruses 
over the Internet.  There exist a plethora of methods to protect from these viruses, but 
each works by mitigating the damages the viruses cause, rather than the probability that 
they will hit.  That is, one cannot stop the virus from being sent to a computer but 
protection measures can keep the virus from being downloaded and infecting the system.  
Due to the technical complexity of the various options available for protection, this paper 
will look primarily at the decision to invest in antivirus software. 
 While the technical workings of antivirus software are complicated, they can be 
summarized as follows.  Antivirus software typically works by scanning files that are 
coming in and out of a computer.  These files may come from various sources, but they 
commonly arrive through e-mail or downloads.  Antivirus software employs one or more 
methods to ensure the safety of these files.  First of all, it may use its own virus 
definitions to search out files that fit these descriptions.  Thus the antivirus software will 
scan files and compare them to the virus definitions to find the ones that are corrupted.  
File scanning is generally performed on a selection of files that are already on the 
computer.  Antivirus software also engages in the scanning of emails and attachments.  
This works in one of two ways:  either the program will scan files from the e-mail server 
before passing them to the computer or it will scan files on the computer before passing 
them to the e-mail program.  Additionally, some antivirus programs will scan files as they 
are downloaded (download scanning), try to detect code in emails that appears to be like 
past viruses (heuristic scanning), or scan what is called active code that is common in 
web pages and may be potentially damaging (active code scanning).40  As these 
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descriptions suggest, antivirus software provides benefits both to you and to others.  By 
catching viruses before they are spread to your system, to other users on your network, 
and to your personal e-mail contacts, antivirus software serves to mitigate the damages 
viruses cause.  Typical antivirus software packages cost anything from $30 to $50 for 
individuals and include a yearly fee, usually around $20, to continue upgrading virus 
definitions.41 
 Of particular interest to the decisions to invest in antivirus software are the recent 
virus outbreaks during the summer of 2003, especially the SoBig.F variant of the SoBig 
virus.  SoBig.F was one of the biggest and most damaging viruses in recent history.  It 
struck on August 18 and spread rapidly.  At the time, it was the world’s fastest spreading 
virus (until the Mydoom virus took over this title in January 2004).42  It was formatted as 
an e-mail attachment that activated itself when opened by the user.  Because many users 
thought the e-mail came from a secure source, they mistakenly opened it.  However, the 
e-mail actually comes from a “spoofed address” or one compiled by the virus through 
searching files on previous senders’ computers.  Once opened, it installs itself onto the 
user’s hard drive and searches through the computer’s files for e-mail addresses.  It then 
uses these e-mail addresses and its built-in e-mail program to send itself on.43  The 
damages the SoBig.F virus causes come from the volume of messages it sends.  It is 
responsible for bogging down servers with e-mails and slowing down networks.  This has 
caused a range of problems for users, including Air Canada, which had to ground its 
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flights until the computer problem was solved.44  In a scan of 40.5 million e-mails sent, 
AOL found the virus to be present in over half of them.45  An estimate of its economic 
damages, both from system downtime at infected sites and from the volume of e-mails it 
sends to users who remain uninfected, was around $7 billion, despite the fact that it was 
discovered before it had started to spread rapidly and antivirus definitions were made 
available quickly.46 
 Similar to the other events, investment in IT security showed a significant incline 
after the outbreak of the SoBig.F virus.  As a result of the SoBig.F virus, in addition to 
other viruses seen this past summer, sales of antivirus software have surged, even when 
sales of other software products have been falling.47  A Business Week article reported 
that “due to a midsummer outbreak of computer viruses, spending on security software 
for both consumers and businesses grew an estimated 9.6%, to $5.62 billion, in 2003.”48  
Antivirus software sales for 2004 are predicted to rise another 10.2%.49  Along with the 
antivirus software spending increase, the 2003 Global Security Survey of financial 
institutions around the world conducted by Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu found that 47% of 
respondents have increased IT security staffing and 63% either have installed or plan to 
install a Chief Security Officer or Chief Information Security Officer within the next 2 
years in order to address security concerns.50  In addition, Ernst & Young’s Global 
Information Security Survey 2003, given to 1,400 organizations worldwide, showed that 
                                                 
44
 “SoBig.F breaks virus speed records.” 
45
 “SoBig.F breaks virus speed records.” 
46
 Naraine, Ryan. “The ABC’s of the SoBig Virus.” eSecurityPlanet.com. 20 Sep. 2003. 24 Apr. 2004. 
<http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.php/3075171>. 
47
 Rupley, Sebastian. “Tales of Woe for Software.” ABC News. 10 Feb. 2004. 23 Apr. 2004. 
<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/ZDM/software_sales_2003_pcmag_040210.html>. 
48
 “Software: Pay-As-You-Go Is Up and Running.” Business Week Online. 12 Jan. 2004. 
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_02/b3865607.htm>. 
49
 “Software: Pay-As-You-Go Is Up and Running.” 
50
 “Global Security Survey 2003.” Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. <www.deloitte.com/gfsi>. 
risk reduction was a major reason for investing in protection in 78% of organizations, in 
comparison to legislative or regulatory compliance affecting only 48% and reputation or 
trust affecting 47%.51  Thus the evidence points toward the fact that both consumers and 
businesses are responding to the threats to which they have recently been subjected by 
increasing their focus and their spending on a greater investment in protection.  
 
Data Analysis 
 In order to quantitatively test the results seen in the case studies, a data analysis 
was conducted.  The data set was derived from a hurricane simulation game given to 
approximately 200 undergraduate marketing students at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton School.  In the game, students are told that they are moving to a hypothetical 
hurricane-prone country and that they must make decisions to invest in protective 
measures.  They are randomly assigned a housing location and initial home value 
(ranging from $15,000 to $65,000) and given information about the typical hurricane 
season and the relative probabilities of storms hitting each location.  They are also 
provided with information about the effectiveness of the different hurricane protection 
measures.  The students are then told to maximize their total score, which is equal to the 
initial value of the home minus any damages they sustain from storms minus their 
spending on protection.  The game lasts for forty weeks, split into two years of five 
months each.  Once the individual invests in protection, he will not lose it until a storm 
occurs (although he may choose to add more protection at any point).  The level of 
protection ranges from 0 to 100.  The hypothesis being tested was that players will tend 
to invest in more protection during the period after they have sustained a loss. 
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 Several different studies were run in order to test this hypothesis.  First of all, a 
regression was run on the entire population.  The regression equation evaluated was: 
Y = Intercept + ß1Lag(Loss) + ß2Month + ß3Lag(Miss) + ß4Total Loss +  
In this equation, the dependent variable Y represents the protection level purchased by 
each individual.  The factors evaluated for their influence on protection level were: (1) 
Lag(Loss), or the magnitude of the loss sustained in the period before, (2) Month, which 
was tested for a linear relationship since the game begins in June and progresses further 
into the severe hurricane season in the later months, (3) Lag(Miss), which is a binary 
variable representing whether or not the person lived close to an area that was hit by a 
storm the period before and sustained damages greater than $20,000, 52 and (4) Total Loss 
to see if there was a cumulative effect aside from the recency effect, or the effect caused 
by the period before and represented by the Lag(Loss) variable.  In this original analysis, 
the intercept coefficient was 22.7, the Lag(Loss) coefficient was -.00022, the Lag(Miss) 
coefficient was -7.6, and the Total Loss coefficient was .000026 (Appendix A shows a 
chart of the coefficients and their p-values).  Of these coefficients, all except Total Loss 
were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  From this analysis, the 
hypothesis that Lag(Loss) will tend to increase investment in protection does not hold. 
 The data was then evaluated at the individual level to correct for an aggregation 
bias in which some percentage of individuals might show a positive effect in future 
investment due to the Lag(Loss) variable whose effect would be diluted when combined 
with the total population.  This also served to control for individual differences in 
baseline protection investment levels.  Forty randomized individual regressions were run 
                                                 
52
 Homes are assigned to an area numbered 0 to 5. A storm that hits close to a home hits an area one 
number away in either direction. 
using the same model as was used with the aggregate data.  The results showed that the 
loss sustained in the period before, represented by the Lag(Loss) variable, did not 
significantly increase protective measures.  Out of the 40 observations examined, only 28 
showed a positive correlation between Lag(Loss) and investment in protection.  
(Appendix E shows the direction of the coefficients for all variables of all observations 
regardless of statistical significance).  Of these 28, only one was statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level.  An additional four observations were significant but negative. 
(Appendix B shows a chart of the five regressions in which Lag(Loss) had a significant 
effect, Appendix C shows the correlations of all observations and the p-values for 
Lag(Loss), and Appendix D shows a chart of the statistical significance and direction of 
the coefficients for all variables of all observations).   
Even though most of the regressions did not show Lag(Loss) to be statistically 
significant, there still could have been a smaller effect if the p-values tended to be in the 
lower range.  Under the null hypothesis that Lag(Loss) does not have an effect on 
protection level, the p-values should show a uniform distribution.  To test for a relative 
significance of the Lag(Loss) variable in comparison to the uniform distribution, its p-
values were plotted.  The histogram shows that the p-values do not seem to be skewed 
toward the low end (Appendix F shows the histogram).  Although a greater quantity of p-
values appears in the range of 0 to .33, at least four of these values represent those 
coefficients that were significant at the 95% confidence level but negative.  Thus, there is 
a slightly higher concentration of p-values in this range, but it does not support the theory 
that Lag(Loss) has an effect on increased investment because some of these values 
represent coefficients in the opposite direction.  With this taken into account, the chart 
depicts a fairly uniform distribution of p-values. 
Thus it seems that the data does not strongly support the hypothesis that 
Lag(Loss) has an effect on increasing the protection level.  There are several reasons why 
this might be the case.  First of all, several difficulties were encountered in analyzing the 
data set.  One problem is the fact that participants can invest each period but they cannot 
uninvest.  The chosen protection level stays in place until a storm hits some location.  
Therefore, we may see several periods in a row where the participant’s level of 
investment does not change.  These data points, however, cannot be excluded because the 
participant still has the opportunity to invest in more protection during every period.  
Additionally, there may be a constraint on the participant’s ability to invest in greater 
levels of protection.  That is, if the participant has already invested in a protection level of 
100, he may still sustain a loss but be unable to raise that level during the next period.  
Thus, this constraint may cause the effect of Lag(Loss) to be mitigated.  Of the 40 
participants studied, 6 or 15% may have been constrained by this fact, as they chose to 
invest in protection of 100 more than one time. 
Another explanation for the lack of clear results may be that Lag(Loss) had some 
effect, but that it was small.  This point is supported by the evidence showing that 28 
observations were positive.  The 28 positive observations represent a statistically 
significant increase above the expected mean value:  
Z value = (28/40 – 20/40) / ( ((1/2 * 1/2) / 40)) = 2.5 > 1.96  
Furthermore, the small coefficients may have a large effect depending on the value of the 
loss sustained.  Consider the individual with the following coefficients as an example: 
Intercept Lag(Loss) Month Lag(Miss) 
Total 
Loss 
1.46 0.001 2.937 16.16 -0.00037 
 
According to the regression, the individual would increase his protection level on average 
1.46 * Intercept + .001 *Lag(Loss) + 2.937 * Month + 16.16 * Lag(Miss) + (-.00037) * 
Total Loss.  This person also sustained an average Lag(Loss) of $1,384.62.  This shows 
that the person would on average be expected to increase protection by 1.38 (on a scale of 
0-100).  While this is a small number on average, so is the average of losses sustained.  If 
the Lag(Loss) value is higher, so will be the expected increase in investment.  In fact this 
is exactly what we see.  When this person sustained a loss of $12,000, the level of 
protection was increased by 15 (or $50 in spending on protection out of a possible $310), 
slightly greater than the 12 that the regression would predict.   
Furthermore, the results of the simulation may not match those predicted by the 
case studies due to the nature of the game.  The decision-making process is likely to be 
more involved in real life situations where people have more to lose from having their 
property destroyed.  Therefore, in the real world, people might be risk averse and enjoy 
utility from investing in protective measures.  This may not be captured in the game 
atmosphere where utility is derived from a higher score alone.   
On the other hand, it is possible that losses must reach a threshold level above 
which we will see increased investment in protection.  Perhaps losses in the simulation 
were not widespread enough to encourage more investment.  In addition, players may 
have doubts about the effectiveness of different protection measures, a hypothesis 
supported by the fact that the actual protection value is unobserved by the player and 
differs from what he thinks he is getting.  Moreover, participants may simply 
underestimate their likelihood of being hit by another storm.  Due to the nature of the 
game, they are unable to research and seek out information on these two factors to give a 
more comprehensive picture of the benefits they might receive from investing in 
protection.  While it is perhaps naïve to believe that people consistently do this in the real 
world, numerous sources exist with this type of information already compiled and readily 
available as recommendations to people faced with investment decisions. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 Aside from proving the importance of past experience in investment decisions, 
one of the main goals of this paper has been to show that many damages can be prevented 
if only investment in protective measures is engaged in ahead of time.  There are several 
possible means for encouraging increased investment, some of which are already in place 
for certain problems.  First of all, increased governmental action, such as enacting and 
enforcing stricter building codes, might be a possible solution.  Government-sponsored 
task forces to study potential problems and evaluate risks, with the goal of suggesting 
future paths to avoid them, also might be useful.  One track that could be particularly 
effective for encouraging individual action is to have greater media focus on preventable 
dangers and ways to keep them from happening.  This, of course, has to be worthwhile 
for the media company.  Subsidies are a possible solution for encouraging such coverage.  
While these subsidies could certainly come from the public sector, they also could be 
obtained through the private sector.  For instance, companies that insure media entities 
could offer premium discounts if the entities engage in campaigns to encourage 
protective measures.  Thus, if the media entities sponsor segments detailing the 
importance of protection and how to go about doing it, insurance agencies could lower 
their rates.  As an example, a news company might offer to include a ten-minute segment 
on protecting your home from hurricanes during the nightly news broadcast in exchange 
for lower premiums given by insurers.  The insurance companies then would benefit 
through lowered future claims from other clients who begin to invest in greater 
protection.  This same strategy could be, and at least occasionally is, followed by insurers 
for their other clients.  For instance, if a client engages in risk-reducing behavior such as 
constructing buildings with a safer structure, the client may receive lower premiums than 
others.  This gives individuals the necessary incentive to invest in protection themselves. 
 
Conclusions 
 In conclusion, it seems that past experiences do have an effect on future decisions 
to invest in protection.  Moreover, these effects appear to be greatest when the magnitude 
of loss is high and when media coverage is present to spread news about the event.  This 
is strongly supported by the results of the case studies, which show greatly increased 
protective measures in response to damages that were often unprecedented in nature and 
highly reported in the news.  Additionally, we tend to see stronger reactions by 
individuals versus the government where it is easier to prevent damages.  Thus, for 
instances such as wildfires where cases will exist in which no possible action by an 
individual could prevent their spread, we see a government action as the primary source 
of investment changes.  On the other hand, virus protection is primarily engaged in by 
individuals and businesses since viruses are relatively easy to prevent given a 
commitment to investment in updated antivirus software.  Thus far, government has 
played a relatively small role in enforcing protective measures in IT security.  
Furthermore, the results of the simulation game may suggest the need for incentives to 
encourage investment by individuals where government involvement is lacking. 
 In terms of future research questions, much could be looked at when trying to 
alleviate the problem of underinvestment beforehand and to prevent large scale losses.  A 
future research project might focus on which of a group of benefits is most worthwhile 
for a particular event.  The costs and benefits of each type of investment could be studied 
in more detail, and recommendations could be published for people to follow when 
choosing their own protection.  Such a project might involve either a case study with a 
firm that is making investment decisions or with the help of an expert in the field, as 
benefits in particular are very difficult to estimate without an in-depth knowledge of the 
type of event against which one is protecting. 
Appendix A: Chart of Aggregate Regression Analysis Coefficients and P-values 
 
Intercept 
P-
value Lag(Loss) 
P-
value Month 
P-
value Lag(Miss) P-value 
Total 
Loss 
P-
value 
22.7 <.001 -0.00022 0.0328 3.02 <.001 -7.6 0.0002 0.000026 0.186 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Chart summarizing the effects of variables where Lag(Loss) was 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level 
 
ID Intercept Lag(Loss) Month Lag(Miss) 
Total 
Loss 
10179403 + - 0 0 0 
10179836 0 + 0 + 0 
10179948 + - - 0 + 
10207196 + - 0 0 + 
10207330 0 - 0 - 0 
 
*  + represents positive coefficient, - negative, and 0 not statistically significant 
Appendix C: Chart of Individual Regression Analyses Showing Coefficients of each 
variable and P-value of Lag(Loss) Variable 
 
ID Intercept Lag(Loss) 
P-value 
Lag(Loss) Month Lag(Miss) Total Loss 
10148976 41.83 0.004 0.1021 -3.53 -3.7 -0.0001 
10157237 -16.49 0.0067 0.1149 14.6 -23.3 -0.005 
10157340 -0.79 0.00056 0.1715 4.18 -6.19 -0.00029 
10178576 6.027 0.0001 0.7545 -0.59 -3.04 -0.00002 
10178611 -9.79 0.00126 0.5194 7.15 -29.49 0.0017 
10179200 8.23 0.000000076 0.9995 3.08 -13.28 -0.00028 
10179403 21.68 -0.00064 0.0124 0.959 -0.947 0.0000015 
10179836 1.46 0.001 0.0257 2.937 16.16 -0.00037 
10179948 45.02 -0.0028 0.0132 -15.07 -4.29 0.0033 
10186209 56.4 -0.0004 0.4858 -11.16 X 0.0002 
10186755 12.9 0.00014 0.841 -0.67 -6.59 -0.00016 
10205855 0.11 0.00027 0.5593 0.54 21.1 -0.0008 
10205859 34.7 -0.00038 0.7607 -9.75 13.45 0.0011 
10206096 20.66 0.00045 0.3013 7.23 -0.5 -0.0003 
10206249 40.1 -0.00053 0.4308 10.34 -17.46 -0.0008 
10206423 25.22 -0.0009 0.0865 -1.42 -22.2 0.00008 
10206902 52.74 -0.00042 0.8095 2.02 -14.24 0.00006 
10207149 22.63 0.00007 0.9241 -1.98 -17.4 0.0001 
10207196 36.7 -0.001 0.018 -15.6 13.87 0.001 
10207222 7.39 0.0002 0.2821 -0.67 -5.38 0.0005 
10207330 21.8 -0.002 0.0032 4.43 -45.5 0.00029 
10207434 28.8 0.004 0.2809 17.7 -25.4 -0.004 
10207862 18.26 0.0005 0.663 19.4 -6.6 -0.0005 
10207957 -9.01 0.009 0.0944 8.24 0.728 0.0015 
10207964 34.7 0.0047 0.5855 -1.03 15.4 0.0069 
10208060 -7.4 0.00008 0.8789 6.8 22.7 -0.00068 
10264553 25.7 0.001 0.5085 10.67 -11.25 -0.0003 
10265444 2.611 0.000017 0.9828 19.96 30.61 -0.0006 
10265446 53.15 0.001 0.2889 -5.9 -20.1 -0.00058 
10265540 16.68 0.0009 0.802 17.21 -27.57 -0.0031 
10265549 8.49 0.0004 0.774 5.05 20.85 0.000027 
10265727 -9.54 -0.000015 0.9842 26.09 11.18 -0.003 
10266029 69.21 -0.001 0.2482 3.68 X 0.00076 
10266665 49.62 0.001 0.4786 -4.38 -11.9 -0.00056 
14645136 -1.931 0.0007 0.6456 8.29 -10.6 -0.001 
22648689 50.03 0.0008 0.578 -13.91 11.51 0.001 
40765333 32.6 0.001 0.2505 -3.69 -17.86 0.000062 
40804826 56.99 0.001 0.4874 0.92 X -0.001 
40860692 3.466 -0.00026 0.615 -0.06 -3.21 0.00006 
93683569 51.9 0.0001 0.8761 0.448 X -0.00035 
 
*  X represents unavailable data 
 
Appendix D: Chart summarizing those variables that were statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level 
 
ID Intercept Lag(Loss) Month Lag(Miss) 
Total 
Loss 
10148976 + 0 0 0 0 
10157237 0 0 + 0 - 
10157340 0 0 + 0 0 
10178576 + 0 0 0 0 
10178611 - 0 0 0 0 
10179200 0 0 0 0 0 
10179403 + - 0 0 0 
10179836 0 + 0 + 0 
10179948 + - - 0 + 
10186209 + 0 - X 0 
10186755 0 0 0 0 0 
10205855 0 0 0 + 0 
10205859 + 0 - 0 0 
10206096 + 0 + 0 - 
10206249 + 0 + 0 - 
10206423 + 0 0 0 0 
10206902 + 0 0 0 0 
10207149 + 0 0 0 0 
10207196 + - 0 0 + 
10207222 0 0 0 0 + 
10207330 0 - 0 - 0 
10207434 + 0 + 0 0 
10207862 0 0 + 0 0 
10207957 0 0 0 0 0 
10207964 + 0 0 0 0 
10208060 0 0 0 0 0 
10264553 + 0 + 0 0 
10265444 0 0 + 0 - 
10265446 + 0 - 0 0 
10265540 0 0 + 0 0 
10265549 0 0 0 0 0 
10265727 0 0 + 0 - 
10266029 + 0 0 X 0 
10266665 + 0 0 0 0 
14645136 0 0 + 0 0 
22648689 + 0 - 0 0 
40765333 + 0 0 0 0 
40804826 + 0 0 X 0 
40860692 0 0 0 0 0 
93683569 + 0 0 X 0 
 
*  + represents significantly positive coefficient, - negative, and 0 no significance 
Appendix D: Chart summarizing the direction of coefficients for each variable regardless 
of whether or not they are statistically significant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* + represents positive coefficient, - negative 
*  For the Lag(Loss) variable, 28 out of 40 observations showed positive coefficients 
ID Intercept Lag(Loss) Month Lag(Miss) 
Total 
Loss 
10148976 + + - - - 
10157237 - + + - - 
10157340 - + + - - 
10178576 + + - - - 
10178611 - + + - + 
10179200 + + + - - 
10179403 + - + - + 
10179836 + + + + - 
10179948 + - - - + 
10186209 + - - X + 
10186755 + + - - - 
10205855 + + + + - 
10205859 + - - + + 
10206096 + + + - - 
10206249 + - + - - 
10206423 + - - - + 
10206902 + - + - + 
10207149 + + - - + 
10207196 + - - + + 
10207222 + + - - + 
10207330 + - + - + 
10207434 + + + - - 
10207862 + + + - - 
10207957 - + + + + 
10207964 + + - + + 
10208060 - + + + - 
10264553 + + + - - 
10265444 + + + + - 
10265446 + + - - - 
10265540 + + + - - 
10265549 + + + + + 
10265727 + - + + - 
10266029 + - + X + 
10266665 + + - - - 
14645136 - + + - - 
22648689 + + - + + 
40765333 + + - - + 
40804826 + + + X - 
40860692 + - - - + 
93683569 + + + X - 
  28 /40   
Appendix F: Histogram depicting the p-values of the Lag(Loss) variable for individual 
regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* P-values in the first segment, 0 - .33, represent both those values that are significant but 
negative and the value single value that is significant and positive.  This accounts for the 
relatively higher number of p-values observed in this range in comparison to other 
ranges. 
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